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Abstract—With the proliferation of Trusted Execu-
tion Environments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX, a number
of cloud providers will soon introduce TEE capabilities
within their offering (e.g., Microsoft Azure). Although
the integration of SGX within the cloud considerably
strengthens the threat model for cloud applications, the
current model to deploy and provision enclaves prevents
the cloud operator from adding or removing enclaves
dynamically—thus preventing elasticity for TEE-based
applications in the cloud.
In this paper, we propose ReplicaTEE, a solution
that enables seamless provisioning and decommission-
ing of TEE-based applications in the cloud. ReplicaTEE
leverages an SGX-based provisioning layer that in-
terfaces with a Byzantine Fault-Tolerant storage ser-
vice to securely orchestrate enclave replication in the
cloud, without the active intervention of the application
owner. Namely, in ReplicaTEE, the application owner
entrusts application secret to the provisioning layer;
the latter handles all enclave commissioning and de-
commissioning operations throughout the application
lifetime. We analyze the security of ReplicaTEE and
show that it is secure against attacks by a powerful
adversary that can compromise a large fraction of
the cloud infrastructure. We implement a prototype
of ReplicaTEE in a realistic cloud environment and
evaluate its performance. ReplicaTEE moderately in-
crements the TCB by ≈ 800 LoC. Our evaluation shows
that ReplicaTEE does not add significant overhead to
existing SGX-based applications.
I. Introduction
In the last few years, the cloud has been gaining several
adopters among SMEs and large businesses that are mainly
interested in minimizing the costs of deployment, manage-
ment, and maintenance of their computing infrastructure.
Cost effectiveness is realized in the cloud by coupling multi-
tenancy with tailored distributed algorithms that ensure
unprecedented levels of scalability and elasticity at low
costs [7].
With the recent proliferation of Trusted Execution En-
vironments (TEEs) such as Intel SGX, a number of cloud
providers will soon introduce TEE capabilities within their
offering (e.g., Microsoft Azure [2]). The embedding of
TEEs within the cloud allows the design of secure applica-
tions that can tolerate malware and system vulnerabilities,
as application-specific secrets are shielded from any priv-
ileged code on the same host. As such, SGX has fueled
innovation in the area of secure computation, with an
increasing number of proposals that promote TEE-based
applications in the cloud [24], [32], [31].
Although the integration of SGX within the cloud
considerably strengthens the threat model for cloud ap-
plications, the current model to deploy and provision an
enclave, prevents the cloud operator from adding or re-
moving enclaves dynamically—thus effectively hampering
elasticity for TEE-based applications in the cloud. Namely,
SGX enclaves bear no secrets when deployed; secrets are
securely provisioned to the enclave by the application
owner (also known as Independent Software Vendor or
ISV) after he attests the application code and makes sure
that it runs untampered in an enclave on an SGX-enabled
platform. In a nutshell, dynamic enclave allocation for
TEE-based applications in the cloud requires the ISV to
be online throughout the whole application lifetime. The
only alternative for an ISV is to entrust the secrets of
his application to the cloud provider (in a way similar
to the provisioning of Virtual Machine images that carry
secret material). This, however, obviates the shift to deploy
SGX enclaves in the cloud since it exposes all application
secrets to malware that may potentially penetrate the
cloud infrastructure.
Although the community features a number of studies
on SGX security in the cloud [29], [12], [13], no previous
work has addressed the problem of enabling seamless
provisioning and decommissioning of enclaves in the cloud.
Here, there are a number of challenges to overcome. One
the one hand, such a service should remove the need of an
online ISV. On the other hand, it should warrant ISVs
the same security provisions of the current deployment
and provisioning models, where ISVs attest and provision
secret material to their applications. Furthermore, unre-
stricted enclave replication in the cloud may amplify the
effectiveness of forking attacks for application that keep
persistent state [12]. In a forking attack, the adversary
runs several instances of an application and provides them
with different state or inputs in order to influence their
behavior. For example, consider an authentication service
running in SGX enclaves. To mitigate brute-force attacks,
the service may use rate-limiting and, for example, allow
up to 3 password trials per account. An adversary that
manages to compromise the cloud infrastructure could
launch several instances of the service in order to increase
the number of trials per account and brute-force pass-
words. A service that automatically provisions enclaves
must, therefore, control the number of running enclaves for
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a given application at all times, despite potential malware
that may penetrate the cloud infrastructure.
In this paper, we propose ReplicaTEE, a solution that
enables dynamic enclave replication and de-commissioning
for TEE-based applications in the cloud. ReplicaTEE
leverages a distributed SGX-based service layer that in-
terfaces with a Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) storage
layer to orchestrate secure and dynamic enclave replication
in the cloud. Namely, in ReplicaTEE, the ISV entrusts
application secrets to the service layer and can go offline.
The service layer is a thin software layer that runs in
SGX and handles commissioning and de-commissioning of
enclave replicas on behalf of the ISV. Application secrets
are, therefore, shielded away from malware that penetrates
the cloud, as they are securely transferred from the ISV
to the service layer onto application enclaves. The service
layer also controls the number of running replicas for a
given application, in order to mitigate forking attacks
against victim applications. Finally, in order to prevent
forking attacks to the service layer itself, ReplicaTEE uses
a distributed BFT storage layer that guarantees depend-
able storage despite compromise of a fraction of its nodes.
We design ReplicaTEE to be fully compliant with
the existing Intel SGX SDK. We analyze the security
of ReplicaTEE and show that it enables secure enclave
provisioning and decommissioning even in presence of a
powerful adversary that compromises a large fraction of
the cloud infrastructure. We also implement a prototype of
ReplicaTEE in a realistic cloud environment and evaluate
its performance. Our evaluation shows that ReplicaTEE
only moderately increments the TCB by approximately
800 Lines of Code (LoC) and does not add significant
overhead to existing SGX-based applications.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
In Section II, we review Intel SGX and BFT storage
solutions that leverage TEEs. In Section III, we introduce
our system and threat models, we discuss our design goals
and provide a brief overview of our solution. In Section IV,
we present ReplicaTEE and analyze its security. In Sec-
tion V, we evaluate a prototype implementation based
on the integration of ReplicaTEE with a realistic cloud
environment. In Section VI, we review related work in the
area, and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly overview the main operations
of Intel SGX and we outline existing Byzantine Fault-
Tolerant storage protocols that leverage TEEs.
A. Intel SGX
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is the latest realiza-
tion of Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) by Intel,
available on Skylake and later CPUs. It allows application
to run in secure containers called enclaves with dedicated
memory regions that are secured with on-chip memory
encryption. Access to the encrypted memory is mediated
by the hardware, effectively excluding the OS or any other
software from the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Privileged code on the planform can create and add
data to an enclave with instructions ECREATE, EADD, EINIT.
After creation, the enclave code can only be invoked
using a thin interface via instructions ENTER and ERESUME;
enclave code returns by calling EEXIT, which ensures that
any sensitive information is flushed before control is given
back to the OS.
State persistence across reboots is available through
sealing, i.e., hardware-managed authenticated and confi-
dential persistent storage. Enclaves can use instructions
EREPORT and EGETKEY to retrieve an enclave-specific (and
platform-specific) key to encrypt data before writing it
on persistent storage. Keys are uniquely bound to the
identity of an enclave so that no other software including
no other enclave can access them.1 Note that the sealing
functionality that offers SGX does not ensure freshness.
That is, a malicious OS may present stale state informa-
tion to an enclave, what is commonly referred to as a
rollback attack [33]. This is in part mitigated by the use
of monotonic counters provided by the platform. However,
monotonic counters are apparently slow and the registries
where they are stored wear out with usage [29].
SGX allows a remote party to verify that a piece of
code runs in an enclave on an SGX-enabled platform.
This mechanisms, called remote attestation, uses a Direct
Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [16] scheme that provides
platform anonymity, i.e., the verifier is assured that the
enclave runs on an SGX platform without being able to
tell it apart from other SGX platforms. Remote attes-
tation in SGX is a two-step process. During the first
step, the enclave to be attested proves its identity to
a system enclave present on every platform and called
quoting enclave. The latter has access to the DAA signing
key and produces a publicly verifiable quote that allows
the verifier to remotely attest the enclave. In its current
implementation, attestation involves an Intel service (Intel
Attestation Service, IAS) that mediates communication
between quoting enclaves and remote verifiers. In particu-
lar, the IAS only allows registered parties to issue remote
attestation requests. Also, the quote produced by a quoting
enclave is encrypted under the IAS public key, so that
only the IAS can proceed with the verification. The IAS
then signs a publicly verifiable statement to confirm that
the enclave runs on an SGX platform. As a by-product
of the attestation protocol, the prover and the verifier
establish a mutually authenticated Diffie-Hellman key. In
particular, the verifier signs its ephemeral key and the
enclave must hold the corresponding verification key to
verify the signature. Also, the quoting enclave (and IAS)
guarantee that the prover ephemeral key belongs to that
specific enclave running on an SGX platform.
B. Byzantine Fault-Tolerant Storage using TEEs
The community features a large number of Byzantine
Fault-Tolerant protocols (BFT) [20], [8], [19] based on state
replication across different nodes, called “replicas”. Some
replicas may be faulty and their failure mode can be either
1Keys may also be bound to a “sealing authority” in order to allow
secure storage across different versions of the same application.
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crash or Byzantine (i.e., deviating arbitrarily from the
protocol [26]). Classical BFT protocols require 3f+1 nodes
and O(n2) communication rounds among these nodes in
order to tolerate up to f Byzantine nodes.
Since agreement in classical BFT is rather expensive,
prior work has attempted to improve performance by lever-
aging trusted hardware. Namely, previous work showed
how to use trusted hardware to reduce the number of repli-
cas and/or communication rounds for BFT protocols [10],
[23], [34]. For example, MinBFT [34] is an efficient BFT
protocol that reduces the communication rounds and the
number of replicas used by conventional BFT protocols,
by leveraging functionality from TEEs, such as Intel SGX.
As a result, the number of required replicas is reduced
from 3f + 1 to 2f + 1. In MinBFT writers send write
requests (e.g., using a PUT interface) to the replicas,
which are all expected to execute the requests in the
same order (i.e., maintain a common state). Readers can
read content previously written onto the replica nodes.
The main idea of MinBFT is to rely on the sequential
monotonic counter provided by trusted hardware, in order
to bind each message sent to a unique counter value. This
is ensured by requiring a signature from the local TEE on
all messages sent by the replica; the intuition is that the
TEE will sign messages with a given counter value only
once, thereby preventing replicas from assigning the same
counter value to different messages—commonly referred to
as equivocation. More details about MinBFT can be found
in Appendix A.
III. Model & Overview
In this section, we introduce our solution, ReplicaTEE,
which enables seamless replication of TEE-based applica-
tions in the cloud. We start by describing our system and
threat model.
A. System Model
We consider a scenario where a cloud provider manages
a set of Intel SGX-enabled platforms. Application owners,
also known as Independent Software Vendors (ISV), can
upload code to be executed on such platforms. Appli-
cations could either run computation on behalf of the
ISV such as a map-reduce service [31], or provide public
functionalities such as an online password-strengthening
service [24].
Deployment. In a real-world deployment of ReplicaTEE,
application owners would acquire (e.g., rent) VMs at the
cloud and split the logic of their applications (e.g., by
using available tools [27]) in sensitive code to be run in
an enclave and non-sensitive code that can run inside the
VM. Therefore, each of the cloud platforms would host
VMs from different tenants and each VM would have
one or more enclaves. However, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume in this paper that the entire application code
is executed in enclaves. Given this assumption, each of
the cloud platforms hosts multiple enclaves belonging to
different ISVs.
Dynamic Provisioning. Conforming with current elastic
cloud settings, we assume that multiple instances of the
same application enclave may dynamically be started or
shut down. In the following, we use the term application
enclave to refer to an instance of application code running
in an enclave, and we use application to denote the logical
entity spanning multiple enclaves running the same code.
We are agnostic on how the decision to add or remove
application enclaves for a given application is made. For
example, this decision may be taken by the cloud for
reasons such as load, throughput, or efficient resource uti-
lization. Alternatively, the application itself may monitor
its performance and, when needed, ask the cloud to add
or remove instances. Nevertheless, we assume that the
ISV defines a deployment policy that includes an upper
bound to the number of application enclaves that can run
simultaneously. 2 This is needed to mitigate forking attacks
and ReplicaTEE must ensure that the ISV deployment
policy is fulfilled at all times.
Storage. ReplicaTEE leverages a Byzantine fault tolerant
storage instantiation based on MinBFT [34]. We opt to
rely on MinBFT owing to its small code base. We assume
a Key-Value storage abstraction [25] which exports two
operations: PUT(k, v), which stores value v indexed by key
k, and GET(k), which returns the stored value indexed
by key k. We assume that the default value for any key
is a special value, which is not a valid value for a PUT
operation. We also assume that PUT and GET operations
can only be invoked by authorized clients.
BFT storage is primarily used to prevent forking attack
against ReplicaTEE. Nevertheless, applications can also
leverage the storage service to keep either immutable state
(e.g., the private key of a TLS server [9]), and/or mutable
state (e.g., a key-value store [15] that is read/written by
all the application enclaves throughout their lifecycle).
Indeed, secure storage offered by SGX (i.e., sealing) only
allows for local storage and if several enclave applications
require access to common storage, this must be provided
as an additional service.
B. Threat Model
The goal of the adversary that we consider is two-
fold. On the one hand, the adversary may abuse the
enclave provisioning process of ReplicaTEE in order to leak
application secrets. On the other hand, the adversary may
be interested in deploying a large number of application
enclaves (i.e., larger than what is allowed by that appli-
cation’s ISV) in order to amplify the effect of a forking
attack against a victim application.
The adversary can compromise privileged code on a
node and we denote that node as compromised. However,
we include SGX in the TCB and therefore assume that
the adversary cannot compromise SGX components (e.g.,
system or application enclaves) on the compromised node.
We allow the adversary to compromise any number of
nodes that host application enclaves or cloud management
services. However, we only allow the adversary to com-
promise up to f out of 2f + 1 nodes of the BFT storage
2The deployment policy may also define other constraints, e.g.,
number of enclaves running during day/night time, etc.
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layer. We argue that assuming a threshold to the storage
nodes that an adversary can compromise is reasonable
since compromising storage nodes (where no client-code
can be deployed) is sensibly harder than compromising
nodes where (malicious) clients can deploy their code. This
assumption is in line with previous work on distributed
BFT systems [21], [6], [28] and with previous work on
forking attacks against TEEs [29]. Further, this assump-
tion is unavoidable since no secure distributed storage is
feasible when all storage nodes are compromised. Even if
one would na¨ıvely fit the entire logic of a storage node in
an enclave, realizing dependable storage would still require
the assumption that at least one of the storage nodes is
not compromised. Nevertheless, fitting the entire logic of a
storage node in an enclave, leads to a large attack surface
thereby weakening the assumption that enclave code is
not susceptible of compromise. Splitting the logic between
enclave and non-enclave code is the choice of all BFT
protocols that leverage TEEs [21], [6], [28].
We also assume that the adversary controls the network
and as such controls the scheduling of all transmitted
messages. Finally, we do not consider DoS attacks and we
do not take into account attacks specific to SGX, such as
the ones that exploit side-channels [14]. We note that mea-
sures to mitigate attacks against SGX are orthogonal to
ReplicaTEE and could be deployed alongside our solution.
C. Overview
To the best of our knowledge, there is no mechanism
that enables enclave replication in a way that is transpar-
ent to the enclave owner. Clearly, a cloud provider can
autonomously start an arbitrary number of enclaves as
long as they do not require any secret material, nor do
they need to access any confidential state information.
However, as soon as an enclave requires a secret key
(e.g., a TLS server such as Talos [9]) or access to some
confidential state (e.g., an encrypted key-value store such
as SecureKeeper [15]), the enclave owner must be involved
in the enclave startup process for attestation and secret
provisioning.
Apart from the functional requirement of an online
application owner, automatic enclave deployment in the
cloud faces a number of security challenges. Namely, if de-
ployment of application enclaves is mainly handled by the
cloud, an adversary that manages to compromise the cloud
infrastructure may try to run multiple enclaves of a given
application, in order to mount forking attacks [12]. The
enclave replication service must, therefore, be constantly
aware of the number and status of deployed enclaves for a
given application.
If we aim at designing an enclave provisioning service
that removes the burden of being constantly online from
the application owner, we should ensure that such service
warrants its correct behavior to application owners and
that confidentiality of the secrets is maintained in all the
steps of the provisioning chain: from the application owner,
until the target application. The security provisions of
SGX make such a platform a promising candidate for
the service we aim to design. If the provisioning service
runs in an enclave, application owners can attest its code
to ensure that the secrets of their applications will be
handled properly. After attestation, an application owner
can securely upload the secret key of its application and
its MRENCLAVE to the provisioning service. From this
moment on, the provisioning service acts on behalf of
the application owner, by attesting enclaves of that ap-
plication, ensuring that their untampered code runs in an
enclave on an SGX-enabled platform, and by provisioning
the application secrets. The provisioning service must also
make sure that enclaves are deployed according to a policy
set by the application owner, in order to mitigate forking
attacks.
In our design, the provisioning service ensures that
the ISV deployment policy is respected, but it does not
decide when an enclave for a given application should be
provisioned or decommissioned. The provisioning service
should only assist the cloud when provisioning or decom-
missioning takes place. Namely, the decision to add or
remove enclaves may involve business logic specific to the
cloud provider. We separate our provisioning service from
any business logic, so that the same service code may be
used by several cloud providers. Furthermore, our design
facilitates the use of open-source code that can be audited
via remote attestation or publicly vetted.
We augment the cloud software stack with a layer
named Enclave Management Layer (EML), dedicated to
elastic enclave provisioning. EML is in charge of provision-
ing and decommissioning enclaves on behalf of application
owners. EML is designed to run entirely in SGX so that
(i) application owners can verify its code and (ii) sensitive
data entrusted by application owners to EML is shielded
by any other software running on the same host.
EML is distributed across enclaves and leverages a
master-slave approach to ensure progress despite potential
crashes. Since EML itself may be victim of forking attacks,
we couple it with a BFT Storage Layer (BSL) that provides
consistent storage despite Byzantine faults of a fraction of
its nodes. EML uses BSL to maintain at all times a con-
sistent view of the requests to provision/remove enclaves
and the progress it has made to handle such requests. This
design allows us to prevent forking attacks on EML while,
at the same time, keeping the code-base of the provisioning
service small enough to be run entirely in an enclave.
Coupling a lightweight management layer such as EML
and a BFT storage layer such as BSL, we enable the cloud
to dynamically provisions enclaves to applications, while
ensuring protection against forking attacks. Our solution
is depicted in Figure 1. In a nutshell, application owners
entrust the cloud provider with the application code, and
EML with the secret material that the application needs
to run (e.g., a secret key). When a new application enclave
must be provisioned, EML acts on behalf of the application
owner and ensures that (i) the deployment of the new
enclave does not violate the policy defined by the appli-
cation owner, (ii) the application code runs in an enclave
on an SGX-enabled platform, and that (iii) the enclave
is provisioned with the appropriate secret key, if required.
When dealing with enclave decommissioning, we note that
one cannot tell whether an enclave has been properly shut
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Fig. 1: Sketch of ReplicaTEE system model. Independent Soft-
ware Vendors (ISV) upload applications that may serve third-
party users. The cloud monitors the load of applications and
decides whether to add or remove enclaves for an application.
This operation is carried out with the assistance of the Enclave
Provisioning Layer (EML). The latter leverages the Byzantine
Fault-Tolerant Storage Layer (BSL) that can be also used by
applications.
down or whether its messages are being blocked. To solve
this issue, each application enclave is granted a lease upon
provisioning. That is, when EML provisions an application
enclave, it also provides an “end-of-lease” timestamp. The
application enclave should run until the lease expires,
unless the lease is otherwise renewed.
IV. Protocol Specification
Before describing ReplicaTEE in detail, we start by
outlining the process of remote proxied attestation which
constitutes an essential building block that will be used in
our solution.
A. Remote Attestation by Unregistered Verifiers
As mentioned in Section II, the Intel Attestation Ser-
vice (IAS) controls that remote attestation is not abused
by verifiers and, in particular, that SGX platforms are not
tracked—which constitutes one of the main goals of Direct
Anonymous Attestation [16]. Nevertheless, involving IAS
as an intermediary in each remote attestation limits the
adoption of this mechanism, especially by parties who are
not registered with IAS. This limitation becomes especially
relevant if the enclave runs a public service like a mail
server. Indeed, it is rather unrealistic to assume that all
users interested in setting up a mail account are registered
to IAS; yet, users may want to attest the code of the mail
server and ensure it runs in an enclave on an SGX-enabled
platform.
In order to overcome this limitation and enable remote
attestation with unregistered verifiers, we utilize a proxy
registered to IAS. The proxy can be deployed by the
cloud provider or by a third-party. Our proxied attestation
protocol is depicted in Figure 2. There, we only provide
an overview of the protocol; detailed message contents
EML: Verifier
EnclaveV EnclaveP
IAS AttestationProxy
Request(PKSPID)
KPDH
KVDH,SigV(KVDH)
derive KDH
QUOTE[MRENCLAVE,meta,Sigsgx]
PKV
resIAS=Verify(QUOTE)
Verify(MRENCLAVE,
 meta, resIAS)
resIAS
SAPP
APP: Prover
SAPP
derive KDH
secret
provisioned
Fig. 2: Proxied attestation protocol. The DH ephemeral key
of the verifier (KDHV ) is signed either by the verifier itself (as
shown in the figure) or by the proxy. In the former case, the
enclave must have the public key of the verifier. If the ephemeral
key is signed by the proxy, the enclave must have the public key
of the proxy.
refer to the ones defined in the Intel SGX SDK Developer
Reference [4]. Attestation via our proxy comes in two
flavors, depending on whether the prover enclave “knows”
(i.e., holds the public key of) the remote verifier. If the
verifier is known to the prover, the proxy simply relays
messages between prover and verifier; when the prover
outputs and encrypted quote, the proxy (registered to IAS)
forwards the ciphertext to IAS in order to get back the
cleartext and provides the latter to the verifier. In case the
verifier is unknown to the prover, the proxy also signs the
ephemeral DH key chosen by the verifier. Therefore, the
prover enclave must embed the public key of the proxy. 3
Our proxied attestation protocol allows any party to
remotely attest an enclave and to establish an unilaterally
or mutually authenticated DH key—depending on whether
the identity of the verifier is known to the prover.
Note that our protocol is compliant with the standard
attestation protocol that leverages the SDK provided by
Intel for SGX and only require the enclave developer
to include the public key of the proxy, in cases where
attestation requests are expected from unknown verifiers.
B. ReplicaTEE Protocol Details
Setup. Recall that ReplicaTEE comprises two layers: a
BFT storage layer named BSL and an enclave provisioning
layer called EML. We assume that BSL is setup initially by
the provider conforming with the setup of MinBFT [34].
The setup of EML unfolds as follows. The cloud provider
C (or a third party) starts N enclaves, each running an
instance of EML. The enclaves must attest each other and
agree on a group key for secure group communication. For
this task, we require each EML enclave to be aware of
the identity of its peers (in order to attest them) and
of the number N of enclaves that form EML. We use
the group key exchange protocol by [17] and denote by
3Remote attestation using the standard SDK requires the
ephemeral DH key of the prover to be signed and it also requires
that the prover has the corresponding public key.
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kEML the established group key. Note that attestation
rules out active attacks. That is, SGX attestation ensures
that only an instance of EML enclave running in an SGX
environment can participate in the key agreement protocol.
Once EML has been set up, the enclaves jointly generate a
key-pair for a signature scheme and publish the verification
key. Application owners must embed this key in their
applications, in order to enable application enclaves to
verify the legitimacy of the messages received from EML
during attestation.
EML enclaves are organized in a Master-Slave ap-
proach. By default, the master enclave is the enclave that
has the largest enclave identifier. During normal operation,
the master is in charge of carrying out the main operations
in EML while slaves simply assume a passive role.
EML’s master implements a variant of the so-called
“node guarding” protocol to keep track of the availability
of the slaves; this essentially consists of the master ex-
changing alive messages with the slaves at regular intervals.
The master enclave periodically sends a beacon request
to the slaves to transmit information about their current
state (e.g., stopped, active). If a slave does not respond
to the request of the master within a certain timeout, the
master considers the slave to be crashed and relays this
information to the remaining slaves. On the other hand,
the slaves also use this protocol to monitor availability of
the master; if a request from the master is not received
after a certain timeout, the slaves assume that the master
itself has failed. In this case, the slave with the highest
identifier from the set of active slaves, assumes the role of a
master and starts issuing the beacon requests. This process
ensures a continuous operation of EML in spite of potential
crash failures. Needless to mention, this entire lightweight
protocol runs within the enclaves of EML nodes. Further,
if one of the EML nodes crashes, it can be restarted and
it can recover its state (e.g., kEML, EML node endpoints,
etc.) from the BSL storage layer.
Notation. We denote an application and its binary by
α and bα, respectively. Also, pα denotes the deployment
policy defined by the application owner. In this paper,
we assume the owner simply sets an upper bound to the
number of enclaves that can run simultaneously. However,
ReplicaTEE can be easily extended to account for more
complex deployment policies.
EML assigns identifiers to applications and enclaves.
An identifier for an enclave of application α looks like
eid = α||mrα||hα, where mrα is the MRENCLAVE of
the application, and hα corresponds to the hash of the
key established between EML and the enclave during
attestation.
In order to keep track of applications and enclaves,
EML leverages the storage functionality offered by BSL.
In particular, for each application α, EML keeps track of
the following metadata:
1) pα: Upper bound to number of running enclaves.
2) mrα: MRENCLAVE.
3) akα: Application secret key.
4) encα: A list of tuples (eid, key, st, eol) where eid is
an enclave identifier, key is the key established be-
tween EML and the enclave during attestation, st
is a status variable, and eol is the current end-of-
lease timestamp for that enclave. Variable st can take
values in {att, run, tbd, tbs, sus}. An enclave has
status “attested” (att) after being attested by EML.
The status is changed to “running” (run) when the
enclave is provisioned with the application secret key.
The enclave status is set to “to be deleted” (tbd)
or “to be suspended” (tbs) when the cloud requests
the enclave to be deleted or suspended, respectively.
Finally the status is set to “suspended” (sus) when the
enclave has been suspended.
EML exports the identifiers of applications and en-
claves to the cloud C in order to efficiently manage enclaves
for a given application. Note that application and enclave
identifiers do not bear any sensitive information apart from
the number of enclaves running for a given application—an
information already available to the cloud.
We assume that the integrity and the confidentiality of
data written/read to BSL (via PUT/GET) are protected
by means of an authenticated encryption scheme. The key
material for authenticated encryption is derived from the
key shared by all EML enclaves, namely kEML, by means
of a key-derivation function.
We use application identifiers as the keys to the stor-
age service and for each application we store a “flat”
database to keep information of that application and its
enclaves. In order to ease exposition, we slightly overload
the PUT/GET interface as follows. We write Get(α; attr)
to fetch only the value of attribute attr for application
α. Similarly, Put(α; attr := value) sets attr to value,
leaving all other attributes at the same key unchanged. We
also write Get(α; encα : eid) to fetch only the enclave
information related to eid (i.e., key, st, eol) from the
list encα. Also, Put(α; encα : 〈eid′, key′, st′, eol′〉)
writes to the list of enclaves encα of application α; if
encα already has a tuple with eid == eid
′, this operation
only updates the remaining fields to key′, st′, and eol′,
respectively. If encα has no tuple with eid == eid
′, then a
new tuple 〈eid′, key′, state′, eol′〉 is appended. We stress
that this notation is only to improve the readability of our
pseudocode. In reality, we always read and write the whole
data associated to a given key.
Attestation of EML Service and Initial Upload
of Code. Algorithm 1 lists the main steps carried out
when an application owner wants to upload his appli-
cation to the cloud. Before the application owner can
entrust the management of his application to EML, he
must verify the identity of the EML enclave and estab-
lish a secure channel. This is captured by the function
ProxiedAttestation(eEML, mrEML) that takes as input
the endpoint of the enclave to be attested and the expected
MRENCLAVE. The function returns the key established
with the prover enclave, if attestation is successful; other-
wise it signals an error by returning ⊥.
Once the application owner has established a secure
channel with EML, he uploads pα, mrα, kα to EML and
bα to C. EML writes pα, mrα, kα, ⊥ to BSL and sends
an acknowledgement to the application owner. The cloud
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Algorithm 1 Attestation of the EML Service and Initial
Upload of Code
1: [Application owner]
2: function Attest-Upload
3: k ← ProxiedAttestation(eEML, mrEML)
4: if kα,EML ==⊥ then
5: return -1
6: end if
7: Send 〈pα, mrα, kα〉 to eEML
8: Send 〈bα〉 to C
9: end function
10: [EML ]
11: function Initialize(α, pα, mrα, kα)
12: Put(α; pα, mrα, kα, ⊥)
13: end function
Algorithm 2 Deployment Request
1: function Provision Request(α, e)
2: mrα ← Get(α; mrα)
3: kα,EML ← ProxiedAttestation(e, mrα)
4: if kα,EML ==⊥ then
5: return -1
6: end if
7: hα ← H(kα,EML)
8: eid← α||mrα||hα
9: Put(α; encα : 〈eid, kα,EML, att, ⊥〉)
10: Send(ack, α, e, eid) to C
11: end function
stores bα and also sends an acknowledgement message to
the application owner.
From this moment on, the application owner goes
offline, while EML cooperates with C in order to in-
crease or decrease the number of enclaves allocated to
that application. C can, at any time, issue requests to
EML to deploy or remove an enclave. Similarly, C can
ask to suspend a running enclave or resume a previously
suspended enclave. EML writes requests to storage in order
to serialize them. Then, EML periodically reads from BSL
in order to identify pending requests and dispatch them.
Deployment Request. At this stage, the cloud provider
creates a new enclave e on an SGX platform and loads
the code bα. It then contacts the EML enclave that is
acting as master to trigger the attestation and provisioning
of the enclave. The pseudocode of the steps carried out
is provided in Algorithm 2. Upon receiving a request,
EML enclave attests the application enclave (line 3) and
assigns it an identifier made of the application identifier,
the enclave identity, and the hash of the key established
with that enclave during attestation (line 8). Next, EML
enclave writes to storage tuple 〈eid, kα,EML, att, ⊥〉 to
reflect the fact that enclave eid was attested and it is
ready for provisioning. Finally, EML enclave acknowledges
to C the end of the operation. If C does not receive an
acknowledgement within a given timeout, then C may infer
that the EML enclave handling the request has crashed and
that the request should be issued to another EML enclave.
Termination/Suspension/Resumption Requests.
Algorithm 3 Termination Request
1: function Terminate Request(eid)
2: Parse eid as α||mrα||hα
3: 〈key, st, eol〉 ← Get(α; eid)
4: if st == run then
5: Put(α; encα : 〈eid, key, tbd, eol〉)
6: end if
7: Send(ack, tbd, eid) to C
8: end function
Algorithm 4 Suspension Request
1: function Suspension Request(eid)
2: Parse eid as α||mrα||hα
3: 〈key, st, eol〉 ← Get(α; eid)
4: if st == run then
5: Put(α; encα : 〈eid, key, tbs, eol〉)
6: end if
7: Send(ack, tbs, eid) to C
8: end function
The pseudocode to terminate, suspend or resume an
enclave is provided in Algorithms 3, 4 and 5, respectively.
Requests are invoked by C providing the enclave identifier
eid as an argument. The EML enclave handling the
request extracts the application identifier from eid and
fetches from BSL attributes key, st, eol of enclave eid.
For enclave termination, the EML enclave checks that
st is “run” and sets it to “tbd” (i.e., to be deleted). For
enclave suspension, the EML enclave checks that st is
“run” and sets it to “tbs” (i.e., to be suspended). For
enclave resumption, the EML enclave checks that st is
“sus” and sets it to tbr (i.e., to be run).
For termination and suspension of an enclave, EML
only takes note of the request by setting the status variable
of that specific enclave; the operation is actually completed
at the beginning of the next lease. This is because, as
we argued above, there is no guarantee that the cloud is
effectively terminating or suspending the enclave at the
time of the request. However, the enclave will stop working
at the end of the current lease and its lease will not be
renewed as shown below.
For enclave resumption, once again EML persists the
request to storage by setting the status variable of that
specific enclave; the enclave will be resumed by the main
routine of EML that dispatches provisioning and resump-
tion requests persisted to storage (see next).
Enclave Provisioning/Resuming. The pseudocode to
dispatch requests to provision or resume enclaves is shown
in Algorithm 6. This code is periodically executed by the
EML enclave acting as master. Function FindNext(encα)
on line 3 takes as input the list of tuples storing informa-
tion about the enclaves of application α and returns the
first tuple 〈eid, key, st, eol〉 such that the status variable
st is either “att” or “tbr”. Status “att” means that the
enclave has been attested and it is ready to be provisioned
with the application secret key. Status “tbr” reflects a
suspended enclave that must be resumed. Before dispatch-
ing the request for eid, the EML enclave checks that the
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Algorithm 5 Resumption Request
1: function Resumption Request(eid)
2: Parse eid as α||mrα||hα
3: 〈key, st, eol〉 ← Get(α; eid)
4: if st == sus then
5: Put(α; encα : 〈eid, key, tbr, eol〉)
6: end if
7: Send(ack, tbr, eid) to C
8: end function
Algorithm 6 Dispatch
1: function Run(α)
2: 〈pα, mrα, kα, encα〉 ← Get(α)
3: 〈eid, key, st, eol〉 ← FindNext(encα)
4: if eid! =⊥ then
5: if CountRunning(encα) < pα then
6: if st == att then
7: Send(kα, eol) to eid
8: else . st == tbr
9: Send(resume, eol) to eid
10: Put(α; 〈eid, key, run, eol〉)
11: end if
12: Send(ack, run, eid) to C
13: end if
14: end if
15: end function
number of running enclaves is below the upper bound
set by application owner and that provisiong/resuming
eid does not violate the owner’s constraints. Counting is
carried out by function CountRunning(encα) on line 5.
An enclave is considered as running if its status variable is
set to“running,“to be suspended”, or“to be deleted”. Next,
EML enclave either provisions eid with the application
secret key and the current end-of-lease timestamp, or it
sends to eid a “resume” directive with the current end-
of-lease timestamp. Finally, EML writes to BSL that the
enclave has been served and notifies C.
From this moment on, the application enclave runs
as expected, e.g., executing computation on behalf of
the application owner or serving requests from clients.
However, we require the application to halt its execution
if the current time has passed the current end-of-lease
timestamp received by EML. Recall that a secure source
of time is currently available on all SGX platforms via the
sgx_get_trusted_time() API.
Lease Renewal. The pseudocode shown in Algorithm 7 is
run by the EML enclave acting as master when the current
end-of-lease timestamp is approaching. At this stage, the
EML enclave scans through the list of enclaves belonging to
application α and checks their status in order to determine
whether the application must be suspended (line 4-5),
deleted (lines 6-7), or whether its lease must be renewed.
In the latter case, the application enclave receives the
new end-of-lease timestamp eol′ with a “renew” directive.
Regardless of the operation, the EML enclave pushes the
changes to BSL in order to persist the fact that the request
was handled. Note that function Delete(encα, eid) on
Algorithm 7 Lease Renewal
1: function Renew(α)
2: 〈pα, mrα, kα, encα〉 ← Get(α)
3: for 〈eid, key, st, eol〉 in encα do
4: if st == tbs then
5: Put(α; 〈eid, key, sus, eol〉)
6: else if st == tbd then
7: Delete(encα, eid)
8: else if st == run && eol < eol′ then
9: Send(renew, eol′) to eid
10: Put(α; encα : 〈eid, key, run, eol′〉)
11: end if
12: end for
13: end function
line 7 removes from encα the tuple referring to eid and
writes the updated list of tuples to storage.
C. Dealing with Application Shared State
Recall that some applications need to keep state to
ensure its correct operation. Indeed, in a model where the
cloud runs applications that span several enclaves, a shared
storage layer might be required. This is because the sealing
functionality of SGX is designed only to keep local state
and does not allow state to be shared across enclaves. In
this case, newly provisioned enclaves should maintain a
consistent view of such a state—otherwise the security of
the overall service might be at risk. For example, in S-
NFV [32], the adversary could run two separated instances
of the application and route state updates only to one
instance, while exclusively pushing traffic flows to either
instances. Hence, the outcome of processing a given flow
may be different and dependant on whether it is carried
out by one instance or the other. Similarly, password-
strengthening services like Safekeeper [24] rely on rate-
limiting to keep passwords secret. Having access to multi-
ple isolated application instances, allows the adversary to
infringe the restriction imposed by the rate-limiting policy.
ReplicaTEE’s BSL can be used by such applications
to share consistent state among their enclaves. Namely,
whenever needed, authorized applications in ReplicaTEE
can read/write their latest state from/to the storage layer
using the offered PUT/GET interface. That is, our stor-
age layer acts as consistent storage medium for various
application enclaves to synchronize on their latest appli-
cation state. For example, an enclave providing password
strengthening service can continuously write the number of
trials attempted on the storage layer. This allows to enforce
rate-limiting across all application enclaves running the
same service. In Section V we complement the evaluation
of ReplicaTEE by assessing the overhead of using a BFT
storage layer for applications that span across several
enclaves.
D. Security Analysis
As mentioned in Section III-B, ReplicaTEE assumes an
adversary that can compromise up to f storage nodes and
all nodes that run the applications. However, the adversary
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cannot compromise application enclaves since SGX ensures
unhampered execution of code within enclaves as well as
confidentiality of enclave data.
We note that even if the adversary compromises up to
f storage nodes, it cannot impact consensus realization in
the storage layer. Namely, MinBFT [34] tolerates up to f
Byzantine nodes and ensures:
• Safety: all non-faulty storage nodes execute the re-
quests in the same order (i.e., realize consensus).
• Liveness: all clients (i.e., EML enclaves) eventually
receive replies to their requests.
In order to thwart forking attacks, one must ensure that
(i) EML’s log of the enclaves belonging to an application,
namely encα, reflects at all times the number and status
of application enclaves deployed on C, and (ii) that the
number of “running” enclaves in encα is compliant with
the policy defined by the application owner. Naturally, we
must also cater for the confidentiality of the application
secret key throughout the application life-cycle.
1) Secure Enclave Provisioning: We start by analyz-
ing the security of the enclave provisioning process in
ReplicaTEE. Recall that this process allows the owner
of an application α to securely provision his application
enclaves by using the EML service. In line with current
SGX deployment models, the only piece of information
that we regard as sensitive is the application secret key
akα, whereas the application binary is treated as non-
sensitive data.
Before transferring the secret key of his application to
EML, the application owner must attest the EML enclave
and establish a secret key. This is done by leveraging
the proxied attestation protocol of Section IV-A. Note
that during key establishment, the EML enclave cannot
attest the application owner (since the two parties may
have not had any previous interaction). Therefore, EML
accepts application metadata (i.e., the application secret
key, the policy, etc.) from any party. Nevertheless we
assume C to authenticate application owners and that
only authenticated application owners can contact EML.
This is a reasonable assumption since C must authenticate
application owners in order to bill them.
Once the application owner has securely uploaded the
secret application key akα to EML, the security provisions
of SGX guarantee the confidentiality of the key while it
is stored in the memory of the EML enclave. If written to
storage, akα is encrypted and authenticated with keys that
are only available to EML. Finally, EML securely delivers
the key to the application after attesting the code of the
enclave and after establishing a secure channel. Here again,
attestation uses the proxied protocol of Section IV-A. How-
ever, attestation between EML and an application enclave
allows the enclave to authenticate EML. This is achieved
by embedding EML’s public key in the application code.
By authenticating the prover, the application enclaves only
accepts provisioning from EML.
2) Ensuring Consistency of EML Operations: We now
analyze how ReplicaTEE ensures that the number of run-
ning enclaves, for a given application, is always below the
bound set by the application owner through the deploy-
ment policy. We achieve this by ensuring that all updates
that affect the state of application enclaves are always
registered by the storage layer that forms the backbone
of ReplicaTEE. Given that the storage layer implements
a consistent Byzantine fault tolerant storage service, all
registered events are totally ordered on consistent storage.
This design tolerates possible asynchrony or network par-
titioning that could arise in the EML layer. Namely, since
EML enclaves do not run a consistent protocol (they only
execute a lightweight node guarding protocol), consistency
is guaranteed by the facts that (i) all operations handled
by EML enclaves are duly registered on a consistent
storage layer, and (ii) all operations executed by EML
enclaves can be concurrently executed without the need
for direct synchronization since the back-to-back execution
of the same operation does not breach the security of
ReplicaTEE. In what follows, we explain this in greater
detail.
Provisioning/Resuming: Provisioning of an enclave eid
is only executed after the enclave has been attested and the
request to be provisioned has been registered by writing
the tuple 〈eid, key, att, ⊥〉 to BSL (Algorithm 2, line 9).
This tuple reflects the fact that eid has been attested and
it is ready for provisioning. Similarly, resuming of enclave
eid only occurs after the request has been registered by
writing the tuple 〈eid, key, tbr, eol〉 to BSL (Algorithm 5,
line 5). Notice that in both cases, the tuple written to
storage carries the key established with the eid at the time
of attestation. This allows any EML enclave to establish a
secure channel with that enclave in order to securely carry
out requests.
Provisioning or resuming is carried out by Algorithm 6.
Since BSL ensures that write/read operations are serial-
ized, no other enclave will be provisioned or resumed before
the request for eid is dispatched. This holds despite the fact
that the EML enclave in charge of handling the request for
eid, say eEML, may fail, and despite the fact that multiple
EML enclaves may concurrently act as masters.
If eid is to be provisioned and eEML fails right after
provisioning the application enclave (Algorithm 6, line 7),
the new master EML enclave will use the same secret key
key to establish a secure channel with eid and provision the
application secret key once again. Similarly, if eid is to be
resumed and eEML fails right after sending the “resume”
command (Algorithm 6, line 9), the new master EML
enclave will use the same secret key key to establish a
secure channel with eid and send once again the “resume”
command. In the above scenarios, we stress that provi-
sioning or resuming the same enclave does not violate the
security provisions of ReplicaTEE.
We point out that even if two (or more) EML enclaves
acting as masters take in charge the request at the same
time, they will both provision (or resume) eid. Also, they
will both write the tuple eid, key, run, eol (Algorithm 6,
line 10) to BSL in order to reflect that the operation has
been dispatched. Once again, provisioning/resuming the
same enclave and writing the same tuple to storage does
not bring ReplicaTEE to an inconsistent state.
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Only after the enclave status is set to “run” in BSL,
EML enclaves will start provisioning/resuming another en-
clave. This ensures that provisioning/resuming of enclaves
is carried out in strict sequential order and allows EML
enclaves to be always aware of the running application
enclaves for a given application.
Terminating/Suspending: As discussed before, once C
issues a request to terminate or suspend an enclave eid,
there is no guarantee that the enclave has been effectively
deleted or suspended. This is due to the fact that any
attempt from EML to contact eid may be dropped by
the adversary that controls the communication network.
For this reason, we resort to leases and require application
enclaves to stop as soon as the current lease expires, unless
EML renews it.
EML therefore treats an enclave eid as suspended and
sets its status accordingly (Algorithm 7, line 5) only at the
end of the lease. At the time EML receives the request to
suspend eid, it simply writes the request to BSL by setting
eid’s state to “to be suspended” (Algorithm 4, line 5).
However, the enclave is considered as running until the
end of the current lease. A similar approach is taken for
requests to delete an enclave eid. The request is written to
BSL by setting eid’s status to“to be deleted”(Algorithm 3,
line 5), however the enclave will be considered as running
until the end of the current lease. At that time, the enclave
metadata is deleted from storage (Algorithm 7, line 7).
Note that enclaves considered as running (i.e., the ones
with status set to “running”, “to be suspended”, or “to
be deleted”) affect the decision of whether a request to
provision/resume an enclave should be completed. That
is, an enclave is provisioned/resumed only if the number
of enclaves considered as running is below the threshold
set by the application owner (Algorithm 5).
Lease Renewal: At the end of a lease, EML proceeds
to renew the lease to all application enclaves with status
“running”. If a EML enclave crashes after renewing the
lease to a given enclave eid, but before writing to BSL that
the operation was completed (Algorithm 7, line 9, then eid
will receive the same renewal message from another EML
enclave taking up the master role. Once again, repeating
the lease renewal operation issuing the same end-of-lease
timestamp to the same enclave does not constitute a
security breach.
V. Performance Analysis
A. Implementation Setup
We deployed the storage service of ReplicaTEE on
five identical servers with SGX supports. Each server
is equipped with Intel Xeon E3-1240 V5 (8 vCores
@3.50GHz) and 32 GiB RAM. The EML instances were
deployed on a machine with Intel Core i5-6500 (4 Cores
@3.20GHz) and 8 GiB RAM. All these machines are
equipped with SGX to run enclaves and are connected with
a 1Gbps switch in a private LAN network. We argue that
this setting emulates a realistic cloud deployment scenario
where the compute servers and their corresponding storage
servers communicate over the cloud’s private LAN (e.g.,
Amazon AWS and S3).
Application Line of Codes (LoC)
MinBFT 339
Proxied attestation (prover) 200
Proxied attestation & provisioning (verifier) 800
DupLESS integrated with ReplicaTEE 80
TABLE I: LoC required for implementing various routines of
ReplicaTEE
As mentioned earlier, we instantiate the atomic storage
service of ReplicaTEE using MinBFT. Our implementa-
tion of MinBFT uses 2 interface functions (createUI,
verifyUI [34]) and a total 339 LoC in SGX enclave in
order to achieve Byzantine Fault Tolerance in the storage
layer.4 We argue that this is small enough to make formal
verification of the consensus layer code base as needed.
In our evaluation, we relied on HMAC-SHA256 MACs to
achieve authentication between replicas and clients [18],
[34]. Notice that our evaluation only accounts for the
normal case of MinBFT (i.e., we do not emulate Byzantine
failures). In MinBFT, if f + 1 replies correspond to a
given version, then the version is committed. This masks
transparently and by default up to f failures. For these
reasons, we stress that Byzantine failures do not affect
performance of such classes of BFT algorithms.
We implemented the proxied attestation procedure de-
scribed in Section IV-A based on the libraries provided by
SGX SDK [4]. To establish a secure channel during pro-
visioning, we rely on SGX’s Diffie-Hellman key exchange
library (256-bit ECC). In our proxied attestation imple-
mentation, the prover’s code in the enclave requires around
200 lines, while the verifier’s code in the EML enclave is
around 800 lines (cf. Table I).5 In our implementation, we
do not measure the latency incurred when communicating
with the Intel Attestation service and we only measure the
time of verifying the report issued by IAS.
B. Evaluation Results
In what follows, we evaluate the performance of
ReplicaTEE in our setup. Namely, we measure the latency
incurred in the provisioning of enclaves and in termina-
tion/suspension/resumption and lease renewal. Note that
we do not evaluate the overhead incurred in the initial
setup phase of EML and the initial code upload by ISVs,
since the setup is carried out only once and the overhead
for ISVs to upload their code to the cloud is not particular
to ReplicaTEE and is incurred by all applications that
leverage cloud-based SGX deployments.
We also measure the latency incurred in the provision-
ing of enclaves with respect to the achieved throughput.
We measure the throughput as follows. The master EML
enclave invokes operation in a closed loop, i.e., enclaves
may have at most one pending operation. We require that
the master EML enclave performs a series of back-to-back
operations (requests) and measure the end-to-end time
4We contrast this to Paxos (based on LibPaxos [31]) which requires
around 4,000 LoC.
5The verifier enclave also includes JSON and Base64 decoder
libraries [5], [3] in order to decode the response from IAS.
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Fig. 3: Evaluation of the performance of ReplicaTEE in our setup. Data points are averaged over 10 independent runs; where
appropriate, we include the corresponding 95% confidence intervals.
taken by each operation. We then increase the number of
provisioning requests in the system until the aggregated
throughput attained by all requests is saturated.
Enclave Provisioning: In Figures 3(a) and 3(b), we eval-
uate the throughput vs latency for the enclave provisioning
process given different storage failure threshold f . We see
that when f = 1 (3 storage servers), the system achieves a
peak throughput of 85 op/s with a latency of 270 ms. On
the other hand, when f = 2 (5 storage servers), the latency
remains almost the same, while the peak throughput is
reduces to 75 op/s. Our findings suggest that the remote
attestation process is the dominant factor in the operation
latency. Notice that even if increasing the fault-tolerance
threshold of BSL reduces the peak throughput (since
it requires more communication rounds), it has limited
impact on the witnessed latency.
In Figure 3(c), we further measure the constituent
latencies incurred in the enclave provisioning process. In
both cases when f = 1 and f = 2, we see that the time
for remote attestation is around 260 ms while the state
update only takes 10 ms without noticeable difference in
either cases. Namely, the state update only comprises up
to 3.7% of the whole provision process even when f = 2.
Termination/Suspension/Resumption/Renewal
Requests: Recall that termination, suspension,
resumption, and renewal requests basically consist of
the EML enclave updating the records corresponding to
the target enclave on the storage layer. These requests are
practically instantiated by a PUT request issued by the
EML primary enclave to update the associated record. In
ReplicaTEE, such PUT requests only consume 0.86 ms
with a peak throughput of 9800 op/s when f = 1 and
0.94 ms with a peak throughput of 4700 op/s when f = 2.
DupLESS instantiation: In Figure 3(d), we evaluate
the performance overhead incurred by ReplicaTEE on
applications that require shared mutable state for their
correct operation. To this end, we implement a variant of
DupLESS [11] and integrate it with ReplicaTEE in the
case where f = 1. DupLESS is a server-aided encryption
scheme that enables data deduplication over encrypted
data. In this scheme, users interested in deduplicating
their files first contact the DupLESS gateway to obtain an
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encryption key that is derived to the file digest. This key is
essentially a blind signature on the file digest that allows
client to obtain encryption keys while keeping privacy of
their files. By using a deterministic encryption scheme
and a key derived from the file digest, two users with the
same file will produce the same ciphertext that, as such,
can be deduplicated by a storage service. By involving
the gateway in the key generation process, brute-force
attacks on predictable files can only be slowed down by
rate-limiting the requests to the server. In our variant
implementation, we integrate DupLESS’s blind signature
scheme within SGX enclaves and use it as an exemplary ap-
plication of ReplicaTEE.6 Namely, we rely on ReplicaTEE
to automatically commission and decommission DupLESS
enclaves and to allow running enclaves to synchronize on
their latest state to effectively enforce rate-limiting across
all running enclaves. Since DupLESS leverages RSA-based
blind signatures, we utilize the SGX-SSL library [1] to
implement the signing functionality (with 4096-bit RSA)
with ˜80 lines of code. We deploy the DupLESS servers on
a machine with Intel Xeon E3-1240 V5 and evaluate the
overhead introduced by ReplicaTEE in this setting when
compared to a standalone DupLESS gateway that does not
leverage any functionality from SGX (i.e., the standard
DupLESS gateway described in [11]).
Our results show that the latency incurred by a stan-
dalone DupLESS gateway is 18 ms with a peak throughput
of 330 op/s. On the other hand, integrating a single Dup-
LESS instance in ReplicaTEE achieves almost the same
performance. This confirms that ReplicaTEE does not
add significant overhead to existing SGX-based enclaves.
Notice that adding an additional DupLESS enclave almost
doubles the peak throughput by reaching around 600 op/s
(for 2 DupLESS instances). The throughput exhibited
by a distributed DupLESS instantiation will be however
limited by the peak throughput exhibited by BSL which is
roughly 9800 op/s; in this case, BSL can accommodate for
roughly 30 DupLESS instances. We stress that replicating
DupLESS using ReplicaTEE does not have any noticeable
impact on the latency witnessed by DupLESS users.
VI. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has
addressed the problem of enabling seamless replication of
SGX enclaves in the cloud. We now briefly review related
work in the area.
Gu et al. [22] provide an SDK to enable enclave mi-
gration in the cloud. Here, enclaves are augmented with a
thread that carries out state transfer. The thread in the
source enclave brings other threads to a quiescent state and
ships the internal state to the target enclave; a thread in
the target enclave receives the state, installs it and recover
execution. Since some state information is only available
to the platform, the authors use a number of heuristics
to estimate that part of the state and transfer it to the
target platform. The authors show that their heuristic are
indeed effective in few application scenarios. However, the
6We chose DupLESS because it incurs minimum I/O and allows
us to clearly evaluate the computational overhead of ReplicaTEE.
effectiveness of this heuristic for general SGX applications
remains to be assessed.
Matetic et al. [29] proposed a scheme, ROTE, to enable
rollback protection for SGX enclaves. Recall that the
sealing functionality of SGX provides confidentiality and
integrity but does not guarantee freshness of sealed data.
In a rollback attack, a malicious host leverages this short-
coming to provide enclaves with stale state information.
In ROTE, a set of ROTE Enclaves running on differ-
ent platforms, help one application enclave to maintain
monotonic counters that, when used in conjunction with
the sealing functionality of SGX, provide state freshness.
The set of ROTE enclaves is static and must be setup
by an administrator before applications can leverage the
service. Notice that ROTE does not deal with applications
that span across several enclaves and requires that the
application enclave runs on one of the platform that hosts
ROTE enclaves.
ICE [33] is another proposal that addresses rollback
attacks in SGX. Differently from ROTE, ICE is a “stan-
dalone” solution that relies on hardware modifications to
the platform, including dedicated on-chip registers backed
by off-chip NVRAM.
Brandenburger et al. [12] address forking attacks on
TEEs in application scenarios where multiple clients inter-
act with an enclave running at a malicious host. In order to
counter forking attacks, they require an enclave to create
a hash chain with the history of all performed operations.
When combined with monotonic counters shared with all
clients, such an approach can ensure fork linearizabil-
ity [30].
Proxied attestation was first proposed in [24]. Here, the
proxy is registered with IAS and acts on behalf of the
(unregistered) verifier towards the IAS. Notice that [24]
leverages a proactive attestation scheme where the enclave
itself requests a quote from the platform and binds it to
its ephemeral DH key before seeing the ephemeral DH
key of the verifier. This design saves round-trips during
attestations but is not compliant with the SDK of Intel
SGX; namely, a quote is provided after the ephemeral
DH key of the verifier has been received and a shared
key established.7 Therefore, the scheme of [24] requires
application developer to update their code in order to ac-
count for changes in the attestation protocol. Furthermore,
the attestation protocol proposed in [24] only provides
an unilaterally authenticated DH key exchange, since the
enclave cannot be sure that the ephemeral DH key is the
one chosen by the verifier and not by the proxy. Mutually
authenticated DH key exchange would require the enclave
to embed the verification key of the verifier. However, this
is not viable if the enclave is meant to be verified by any
(previously unseen) user of the cloud service.
7The data structure providing the quote is referred to as msg3 in
the SDK[4] which is returned by sgx_ra_proc_msg2() that processes
the ephemeral DH key of the verifier and a valid signature on that
ephemeral key.
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VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel solution,
ReplicaTEE, that enables dynamic replication and de-
commissioning of TEE-based applications in the cloud.
ReplicaTEE leverages an SGX-based provisioning service
that interfaces with Byzantine Fault Tolerant storage layer
to orchestrates dynamic application replication in the
cloud without the active intervention of the application
owner.
We showed that ReplicaTEE withstands a powerful
adversary that can compromise a large fraction of the cloud
infrastructure. By means of a prototype implementation,
we also showed that ReplicaTEE moderately increments
the TCB and does not add significant overhead to existing
SGX-based applications.
ReplicaTEE therefore emerges as the first secure and
practical solution to support elasticity of TEE-based appli-
cations in the cloud. As such, ReplicaTEE enables applica-
tions from benefitting from high availability, performance,
and cost effectiveness that essentially form the basis of the
cloud-computing paradigm.
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Appendix
MinBFT comprises four routines and unfolds as follows:
1) Request: Clients send their request messages asking
the replicas to execute certain operations. A client
C prepares its requested operation op in message
〈REQUEST, C, seq, op〉σC , where seq records the (lo-
cal) message sequence from each client to prevent
re-execution of the operations, and σC is the client
signature.
2) Prepare: This phase is triggered when the primary
Sp receives a request message m. Once the request
is validated, the primary asks its TEE to generate
a unique message identifier UIp = 〈c,m〉σp . Note
that the counter c is monotonically increasing and the
signature σp is from the TEE. Subsequently, Sp multi-
casts 〈PREPARE, v,Sp,m,UIp, 〉 to the other replicas.
3) Commit: This phase serves to acknowledge a valid
PREPARE message. Each replica Si responds with a
COMMIT message. In particular, each replica multi-
casts 〈COMMIT, v,m,Si, UIi,Sp, UIp〉, where UIi is a
unique identifier that Si gets from its TEE.
4) Reply: A request is committed locally and can be
executed once a replica has received enough (i.e., f+1)
consistent commits, because it is ensured that any
request that commits locally on a correct replica will
be committed on at least f+1 correct replicas eventu-
ally. Therefore, the replica can execute the operation
op and send the reply 〈REPLY,Si, seq, res〉 with the
execution result res back to the client.
5) View-Change: When a primary is suspected to be
misbehaving, a replica can request a replacement of
the primary through the view-change procedure. For
example, when a received request failed to be executed
within a certain timeout, a replica multicasts a view-
change request 〈REQ− VIEW − CHANGE,Si, v, v′〉,
where v′ is the new view number and v′ = v + 1.
If a replica receives f + 1 REQ− VIEW − CHANGE, it
moves to view v′. At this stage the replica multicasts
〈VIEW − CHANGE,Si, v′, CP,O,UIi〉, where CP is
the latest certificate and O is the set of all messages
sent by the replica since CP . Once the new primary
of view v′ receives f + 1 valid VIEW − CHANGE mes-
sages with consistent system state, the view change is
executed by the new primary who broadcasts message
〈NEW − VIEW,Sp′ , v′, Vvc, s, UIp′〉, where Vvc is the
view-change certificate that includes all the received
Client Gateway
h← H(M)
r
R← Z∗N
x← h · re mod N x //
yoo y ← xd mod N
z ← y · r−1 mod N
If ze mod N 6= h then ret ⊥
Else ret K ← H(z)
Fig. 4: RSA blind-signature scheme adapted from [11]. H :
{0, 1}∗ → ZN denotes a hash function, N the RSA modulus, e
the RSA public exponent and d the RSA private exponent.
VIEW − CHANGE messages, and s is the current sys-
tem state which will serve as the initial state of view
v′.
The correctness of MinBFT holds as long as there is at
least one honest node involved in any two quorums, thus
only 2f+1 replicas are required to tolerate f faulty nodes.
Further details on MinBFT can be found in [34].
DupLESS [11] allows clients to derive encryption keys
for secure deduplication in cloud-based storage. Key
derivation is performed in DupLESS by means of an inter-
active protocol between a client and a gateway based on
RSA blind-signatures. The protocol is sketched in Figure 4.
The client secret input is a file M , while the server secret
input is the private exponent of an RSA key-pair. The
corresponding public exponent is available to both parties.
The client computes the hash of the file M and blinds it
with a random value r that he raises to the public exponent
e. He transmits the blinded hash value to the gateway.
The gateway now signs the blinded value with its private
exponent d. The gateway finally transmits the signed
blinded hash back to the client. As ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(N),
we have that y ≡ (hre)d ≡ hdred ≡ hdr mod N . The
client can compute the r−1 mod N , remove the blinding
from y and obtain the signed hash hd mod N . The client
needs now to check the validity of the signature using the
public exponent of the gateway e. If the signature is valid,
the generated symmetric key will be the hash of the signed
hash of the file K = H(z) = H(hd).
The benefits of such a key generation protocol are two-
fold:
• Since the protocol is oblivious, it ensures that the
gateway does not learn any information about the file.
On the other hand, this protocol enables the client to
check the correctness of the computation performed
by the gateway (i.e., verify the gateway’s signature).
• By involving the gateway in the key generation
process, brute-force attacks on predictable messages
(i.e., files) can be slowed down by rate-limiting key-
generation requests to the gateway.
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